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Abstract
Using fixed effects panel data models on a sample of 15 OECD countries over
the period 1970-2007, this article explores the linkages between labor-market
volatility, financial development and welfare state institutions. We analyze the
interacted impact of financial development on the one hand and welfare state
institutions (i.e., overall social spending) on the other hand on volatility of hours
worked and volatility of wages. Our results indicate that financial develop-
ment is associated with higher volatility on labor-markets. Estimates of the
marginal effects show that overall social spending increasingly reduces labor-
market volatility with the degree of financial development, andmore specifically
for low-skilled workers through compensation mechanisms. Finally, we control
for potential reversed causality by running IV-GMM estimations suggesting that
increasing financial development has not threatened the governments’ ability to
play an active role in cushioning fluctuations on labor markets.
Résumé
VOLATILITÉ SUR LE MARCHÉ DU TRAVAIL, DÉVELOPPEMENT
FINANCIER ET DÉPENSES DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE
A l’aide de modèles à effets fixes sur données de panel sur un échantillon
comprenant 15 pays de l’OCDE de 1970 à 2007, cet article s’intéresse aux interac-
tions entre le niveau de développement financier et les institutions de protection
sociale (mesurée à l’aide du poids des dépenses de sécurité sociale dans le PIB)
sur la volatilité sur le marché du travail. Plus particulièrement, nous cherchons
à expliquer les déterminants de la volatilité du nombre d’heures travaillées et
∗CES Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris
School of Economics, MSE, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75647 PARIS Cedex 13. Email:
thibault.darcillon@univ-paris1.fr. This paper has been presented at the 25th Annual Con-
ference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE) at the University of Milan,
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de la volatilité des salaires. Nous trouvons que le développement financier est
associé avec une augmentation de la volatilité sur le marché du travail. Les effets
marginaux montrent qu’augmenter les dépenses de sécurité sociale contribue
à réduire l’impact du développement financier sur la hausse de la volatilité, et
ceci plus particulièrement pour les travailleurs faiblement qualifiés à travers un
mécanisme de compensation. Enfin, nous contrôlons la causalité inverse à l’aide
d’estimations à variables instrumentales (IV-GMM) dont les résultats indiquent
que le développement croissant des marchés financiers a faiblement affaibli la
capacité des gouvernements à mettre en œuvre des politiques afin d’atténuer les
fluctuations sur le marché du travail.
Keywords: Labor-market volatility, financial development, social security expenditure, com-
pensation hypothesis
Mots-clés: Volatilité du marché du travail, développement financier, dépenses de sécurité
sociale, hypothèse de compensation
JEL Classification: F41 · I3 · P16
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession have caused an
unprecedented increase in the unemployment rate in most OECD countries: the
unemployment rate rose from an average of 5.96% in 2008 to 8.13% in 2009. In the
wake of the subprime crash, a majority of political leaders - on both the left and on
the right - sharply damned financial capitalism.1 Many political leaders and scholars
have stressed the consequences of increasing instability on financial markets on the
whole economy at the international and domestic levels.
The main issue that we address in this paper deals with the impact of financial
markets at the international and domestic levels on the labor market instability. Ac-
cording to the standard efficient market hypothesis, more efficient financial markets
should contribute to reducing significantly risks in the economy, including the risks
for workers. We argue that the instability of financial markets can impact the firms’
financial strategy which can affect the fluctuations on labor markets. Data on labor
market volatility reveal that the volatility ofwages growth has increased since several
decades, and this more specifically for low-skilled workers. Our main hypothesis is
that financial markets are likely to affect the workers’ welfare, and more specifically
for low-skilled workers. This arguments is directly derived from the Rodrik’s (1997)
work who argues that trade development intensified competition from low-wage
countries and may be harmful particularly for low-skilled workers. Trade openness
1For instance,“We have over-mutualized risk and so diluted accountability. If the risks are shared
ad infinitum, there’s no longer anyone accountable. [. . . ] Purely financial capitalism is a perversion
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has increased indeed the elasticity of labor demand for this category of workers. We
assume in this paper that financial development - at the international level as well as
at the domestic level - may have amplified this effect.
This paper explores the role of increasing financial development and its interac-
tions with welfare state institutions on labor-market volatility in 15 OECD countries.
First, recent literature in economics has focused on the role of financial development
on macroeconomic volatility (i.e., volatility in output or consumption growth). Few
papers have analyzed the relationship between financial development and labor-
market volatility. We argue that financial development might also affect the fluctu-
ations and the distribution of risks on labor markets. We distinguish two different
channels: in a first channel, financial openness through an increase in foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) has contributed to the increase in labor-market volatility; in
a second channel, financial development has led financial participants to use more
sophisticated instruments and to take excessive risks which has created instability
on labor markets.
In his seminal work, Rodrik (1997) argues that globalization is associated with
an increased dispersion of earnings among low-skilled workers and higher volatility
in wages and hours worked. Trade openness has therefore asymmetric effects be-
tween owners of capital and high-skilled workers on the one hand and semiskilled
and unskilled workers on the other hand. The first category is composed on very
mobile actors whereas globalization has increased the elasticity of the demand for
the services provided by workers from the second category of workers. One of
the other consequences associated with increased trade openness is that wages for
unskilled workers have been eroding and then labor-market instability and insecu-
rity have been increasing. These two phenomena have resulted in an inward shift
in the demand curve and a flattening of the demand curve for low-skilled labor.
Consequently, according to Rodrik (1997), these changes would be associated with
increased volatility in wages and hours worked. OECD (2007) provides empiri-
cal evidence suggesting that labor demand has become more responsive to shocks.
Empirical findings also indicate that the elasticity of labor demand is considerably
higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. One of the potential
explanation of this would be that easier offshoring of production may have signif-
icantly raised the volatility of employment and wages. We suppose in this paper
that financial development at the international and domestic levels has increased
short-term fluctuations in labor demand: first, financial development at the domes-
tic and international levels reduces the bargaining position of labor (Jayadev, 2007).
Accordingly, it was very frequently shown that financial development and more
specifically financial openness (through foreign direct investment) has contributed
to making employers more sensible to labor costs (International Institute for Labour
Studies, 2008). We argue that this effect should be larger for low-skilled workers than
for high-skilled workers according to the ‘capital-skill complementarity’ hypothesis
(Griliches, 1969). In reaction to this more insecure context, Rodrik argues that gov-
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ernments will increase welfare state spending to compensate the negative impact
of globalization on the welfare of low-skilled workers. Beyond trade globalization,
we extend Rodrik’s argument to financial development including an international
dimension with financial openness and a domestic dimension with financial dereg-
ulation.
We use to measure labor market instability two different proxies for labor market
volatility. Using the EU KLEMS database that provides data on averages wages
and hours worked by skill groups from 1970 to 2007, we compute two different
measures of labor-market volatility as the rolling standard deviation for growth rates
of average wages and of hours worked over a five-year-window at the aggregate
level to obtain a measure of volatility. To capture financial development, we use
different measures of financial integration at the international and domestic levels.
We use social security transfers as a percentage of GDP as a measure of welfare state
institutions. As robustness checks we use an alternative measure of welfare state
institutions: government employment.
Using panel data on 15 OECD countries from 1970 to 2005, we first run PCSE/OLS
regressions. Then, to consider the argument that globalization would reduce the
governments’ ability to compensate labor-market volatility but also to address the
endogeneity issue of welfare state institutions, we run IV-GMM estimations. Our
results indicate strong evidence of a positive effect of financial integration at the inter-
national and domestic levels on volatility ofwages and of hoursworked. Wefind that
financial development increases the volatility of hours particularly for low-skilled
workers and the volatility of wages particularly for high-skilled workers. In addi-
tion, our main argument of complementarity between financial development and
welfare state institutions is empirically verified: social security transfers contribute
to the reduction in labor market volatility associated with financial development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our main argument on
the linkages between financial development, risk diversification and labor market
instability. In Section 3, we present our data. we conduct in Section 4 a regression
analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Labor-market volatility, financial development and welfare state institutions
In The General Theory of Employment, Interest, andMoney, Keynes (1936) underlined the
dual role of financial markets. On the one hand, stock markets facilitate productive
investments by transferring risk from firm owners to capital holders. In this line,
Keynes (1936) has stressed that capitalmarkets by increasing financial liquidity play a
positive role: higher liquidity on the financialmarkets that allow to convert a security
into currency immediately and freely has themain advantage of increasing the access
to abundant capital inflows. On the other hand, the expansion of security markets
contributes to making more complex investment decisions. Henceforth, lenders are
able to pledge funds for awhole lifespan of capital goods but also have the possibility
4
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of reviewing their commitments at any timeby selling their assets. In this sense, “with
the separation between ownership andmanagement which prevails to-day and with
the development of organised investment markets, a new factor of great importance
has entered in, which sometimes facilitates investment but sometimes adds greatly to
the instability of the system” (Keynes, p.150-151, emphasis added).
Alternatively, according to the efficiency market hypothesis, the risks should
be diversified to be reduced. The diffusion of financial innovations - in the first
place the operations of ‘securitization’ - that took place in the 1980s in the wake of
financial liberalization process played a considerable role in the process of the ‘Great
Moderation’ that refers to a reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations
starting in the mid-1980s. In other words, the advanced economies would have been
less volatile and safer: the Great Moderation thus denotes a new era of low risks
and high returns. In that sense, securitization played a central role in the Great
Moderation: the aim of securization is to promote liquidity on financial markets by
improving the possibilities of risk diversification (Orléan, 2009). As we review in
the related literature, financial development may have contributed to a significant
reduction in output volatility in the 1980s-1990s, but at the same time labor-market
volatility has sharply increased, and this more particularly for low-skilled workers
(See Table 1). In this vein, a report from the International Institute for Labour Studies
(2008) finds mixed evidence on a positive effect of financial market development on
employment growth, partly because of increased turbulence on the labor market.
In addition, the recent financial crisis has brought back the thesis of ‘financial
fragility’ developedbyMinsky (1986). The argument of the thesis of financial fragility
is that, in times of prosperity, the state of confidence increases as the participants on
financial markets underestimates the risk of bubble bursting. Financial innovations -
such as derivatives - have contributed to the efficiency of financial markets by reduc-
ing transaction costs, increasing financial liquidity and by enhancing the diffusion
of the information. At the same time, these innovations can lead the agents to un-
derestimate or misperceive the risks on the market, and thus to take excessive risks
(Capelle-Blancard, 2009). In line with Minsky’s analysis, Aglietta and Rebérioux
(2005) share the main idea that financial markets are inherently unstable: moreover,
beyond inefficiencies in asset pricing method, shareholder value maximization strat-
egy is incongruent with chronic financial instability. Following this viewpoint, we
argue that instability on financial markets may directly impact fluctuations on labor
markets.2
The aimof this paper is to analyze the relationship betweenfinancial development
and labor-market volatility. The impact of increasing financial development on
macroeconomic volatility (and more specifically on output volatility) has remained
2Numerous studies in human resource management have analyzed the impact of increasing diffu-
sion of the logic based on shareholder value maximization on labor relations and more specifically on
labor flexibility. Thus, the implementation of shareholder primacy encourages the firms of pursuing
a cost-reduction strategy of human resource management (Deakin and Rebérioux, 2009).
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largely theoretically and empirically explored. Bekaert et al. (2006) and Eozenou
(2008) suggest that countries with high levels of financial integration experience
a greater reduction in consumption growth volatility. More specifically, Eozenou’s
(2008) results indicate that consumptiongrowthvolatility is found to increasewith the
degree of financial integration in countries with low level of financial development
and to decrease in countries with high level of financial development. More recently,
Popov (2011) finds that the effect of financial liberalization is positive on growth but
at the same time financial liberalization is correlated with higher tail risk (i.e., an
increase in the left skewness). Stiglitz (2000) argues that capital market liberalization
has not enhanced growth but rather produced higher instability on growth. A
considerable amount of research effort has dealt with the implications of increasing
financial development on growth or unemployment dynamics. In this article, we
want to test empirically the relationship between financial development and the
volatility of the employment and of wages of workers with different skills.
2.1 Financial development and labor-market volatility
A majority of theoretical and empirical papers interesting in evaluating the im-
pact of financial globalization on labor-market finds contrasting effects. It is fre-
quently argued by financial economists that financial development increases the
risk-diversification possibilities and thus would be associated with reduced volatil-
ity. This thesis is theoretically supported by Erauskin (2011) who proposes a model
for a stochastically growing small open economy in continuous time where gov-
ernment spending is productive. In the same vein, Bertola (2007) finds evidence of
substitution, rather than complementarity, between the trade openness and financial
integration in regard with government size. This finding suggests that economic
globalization would decrease demand for redistribution in countries where financial
markets are well developed and thus are a good substitute for government policies.
In other words, better financial markets reduce the positive effect of trade openness
on the size of government. In this case, financial markets allowing a better risk-
diversification are not responsible for generating new risks but, on the contrary, are
considered as efficient instruments to cover risks related to international competition.
By contrast, Thesmar andThoenig (2004) demonstrate that financial development,
by broadening of thepool of external investors (both at thedomestic and international
levels), improves risk sharing but also encourages firms to adopt more profitable
and riskier strategies including for non-listed firms. Financial development has a
general equilibrium effect on wages and price and also affects the strategies of the
non-listed firms: this will result in an overall increase in the uncertainty of sales,
employment and profits in all firms. The model also predicts that the effects of
financial development are stronger when the competition on the product market is
tougher. In this sense, we argue that financial development should lead to higher
volatility in employment and in wages.
Another argument relates to the thesis of financial fragility: it has been often
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argued that financial development has the potential to increase the likelihood of
major economic crises (Saillard, 2012). In advanced as well as in emerging countries,
the frequency of banking and/or financial crises and the degree of labor-market
volatility have simultaneously increased since the early of the 1980s (International
Institute for Labour Studies, 2008). By generating negative externalities in the whole
economy, specifically in periods of financial crisis, financial development thereby
may have an increasing-effect on labor-market volatility. Pagano and Pica (2012)
find strong support for the thesis of ‘dark side’ of financial development claiming
that a developed financial market amplifies the repercussions of financial crises on
employment. Results seem to show that, during banking crises negative shocks
disproportionately impact employment growth in financially dependent sectors in
countries with more highly developed financial systems. Consequently, financial
development is considered as a risk per se as underlined by some scholars (e.g. Stiglitz,
2000): as noted by Pagano and Pica (2012), “the recent events have administered a
sharp reminder that the financial markets may themselves be a source of risk, rather
than a mechanism to price and share it; and financial sophistication may itself be a
source of instability, if it encourages excess risk-taking”.
Hypothesis 1 Financial development at the international and domestic levels is associated
with an increase in labor-market volatility.
The improved risk-diversification possibilities that offers financial development
are, however, not equal among individuals. Buch and Pierdzoch (2013) find strong
evidence of a positive impact of higher degree of financial integration on the volatility
of hours worked, and this particularly for low-skilled workers. They propose a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy: financial
globalization is captured by portfolio adjustment costs, and the costs of adjusting
hours worked are different between high- and low-skilled workers. The two authors
show that financial globalization gives rise to an increase in the volatility of hours
worked: financial globalization is associated with a rise in output volatility that may
trigger more additional hires and fires of low-skilled workers than of high-skilled
workers because the adjustment costs per unit of high-skilled workers are lower for
high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers. Alternatively, their results also
indicate that financial globalization leads to more wage volatility with similar effects
across skill groups.
In a recent paper, Pagano and Pica (2012) find that financial development at the
domestic level increases the volatility of employment, i.e. when the cross-industry
dispersion in stock returns is high (reflecting profit shocks). In other words, financial
development favors labor reallocation across industries from the ‘weaker’ to the
‘stronger’ industries. As a result, if financial development is prone to increase the
expected labor income for workers, it also raises its variance. Workers with high
degree of risk aversion will consider that the increase in their labor income risk
outweighs the benefits from an increase in expected income and will probably be
7
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more resistant against more volatility in financial and labor markets. Because of
higher risks of becoming unemployed or jobless, lower income groups are more
exposed to risk than higher income groups and have thus a higher degree of risk
aversion.
In addition, it is frequently claimed in the literature on earnings volatility that the
access to financial assets allow households to smooth consumption: following this
literature, because low-skilled and low-paid workers have poorer access to financial
markets it becomes more difficult for these households to smooth consumption if
they are hit by negative income shocks (OECD, 2011). However, recent analyses (Ra-
jan, 2010) have shown that political authorities in many countries (in the first place
the United States) have made easier the access to financial markets for the poorer
households. In that vein, following the thesis of financial fragility, the potential nega-
tive externalities on the whole economywould be larger in times of financial crisis in
highly financially developed countries. And this because financial deregulation has
made easier the access to credit for low-income households and has thus increased
the proportion of households owning shares and financial assets. Furthermore, as
witnessed the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008, the bursting of assets bubbles may
have direct impact on the economy’s real sectors: the negative shock on the economy
at large - and more specifically the reduction in credit availability (due to deteriora-
tion of the financial industry’s intermediary function) - are more likely to affect lower
wage-earners (Boyer, 2011).
To sum up, we have shown that labor-market risks are more concentrated on
low-skilled workers whereas financial development should theoretically mitigate
labor-market volatility for high-skilled workers because of improved possibilities of
risk-sharing and of reduced consumption volatility. As a consequence, the risks on
labormarket being unevenly distributed across skill groups, we assume that financial
development should have strong distributional effects and should more impact low-
skilled workers’ welfare. We propose to analyze the political-economic implications
of the consequences of increased labor-market volatility.
Hypothesis 2 Financial development at the international and domestic levels is associated
with an increase in labor-market volatility, more particularly for low-skilled workers.
2.2 Interactions between financial development and welfare state institutions
We investigate in this section the relationship between welfare state institutions and
labor-market volatility. In a political-economy perspective, we argue that govern-
ments will implement specific welfare programs to compensate the negative impact
of financial development on workers’ welfare. Our argument is based on the ‘com-
pensation hypothesis’ that stresses that increasing globalization generates new risks
and thus will result in an increase in welfare state spending.
Political scientists (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1984 or Garrett, 1998) and
economists (e.g., Rodrik, 1997; 1998) analyzed the role of government faced with an
8
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increasing instability in amore globalizedworld. According to the proponents of the
‘compensation hypothesis’, governments will continue to provide social compensa-
tion to workers who are affected by the new risks engendered by globalization.3 The
so-called ‘compensation hypothesis’ is based on two different mechanisms:
1. First, in reaction to this new insecure context, voters will increasingly support
social protection and social insurance (political demand);
2. Then, in response to this political demand, governments will supply more
generous welfare state programs (political supply);
In other words, more generous welfare programs will compensate globalization
‘losers’ for the risks associatedwith increased international competition andvolatility.
This literature assumes that some categories of workers would be exposed to
higher risks. Two different approaches are prevalent in identifying globalization
winners and globalization losers (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Walter, 2010). First,
the sectoral Ricardo-Vinermodel that stresses the sectors’ degree of exposure to global
competition: workers in exposed sectors are more likely to suffer from globalization
than workers in sheltered sectors. Second, the Stolper-Samuelson model that stresses
factor endowments as central determinant: capital holders (including high-skilled
workers) have comparative advantages in developed economies. In this paper,
we adopt an unidimensional approach by focusing only on skill levels since data
provides only information on the ‘skill dimension’.
Empirically, Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1984), Rodrik (1997; 1998), Garrett
(1998) and Swank (2002) find all a positive relationship between trade openness and
the size of government, and more specifically the size of the welfare state. In their
seminal works, Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1984) find that globalization leads
to welfare state expansion particularly in small countries. In this line, Rodrik (1997)
finds a positive relationship between lagged exposure to trade as a share of GDP from
1980 to 1989 and government expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 1990 to 1992.
Using Swiss survey data, Walter (2010) proposes to test the microfoundations of the
‘compensation hypothesis’ and finds out that low-skilled workers (i) are more likely
to feel insecure, (ii) are more in favor of higher state involvement and then (iii) are
more likely to support left-wing parties.4 Conservely, Meinhard and Potrakfe (2012),
in a recent paper, challenge the traditional view of the ‘compensation hypothesis’:
they find no empirical evidence indicating that economic globalization increases the
demand for social insurance.
3Iversen and Cusack (2000) challenge this view: they argue that growing insecurity does not result
from increasing globalization but from the process of deindustrialization.
4About the relationship between insecurity feeling and partisan preferences, Guillaud (2013) finds
that occupation, income and risk aversion are all shaping the individual preferences for redistribution.
For instance, serviceworkers, craftsmen,machine operators and elementaryworkers aremore in favor
of redistribution than the reference category, represented by office clerks.
9
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More interestingly for our purpose, Fatás and Mihov (2001) find that govern-
ment expenditure, through the automatic stabilizers, has a reducing-effect on output
growth volatility. The automatic stabilizers can absorb the shocks associated with
higher volatility and instability better (Stiglitz, 2000). In the same vein, OECD (2011)
points out the importance of taxes (such as unemployment benefits and social assis-
tance) in reducing the impact of earnings fluctuations.
Hypothesis 3 Welfare state institutions reduce labor-market volatility when the influence
of financial markets at the international and domestic levels becomes larger.
By contrast, as underlined above, Erauskin (2011) argues that the role of gov-
ernment in the mitigation of volatility is lower in an economy without restrictions
on capital account because financial development is associated with a better risk-
diversification. Carmignani et al. (2011) find that higher volatility is associated with
larger government size but with a destabilizing effect. Overall, all these results sug-
gest that financial development cannot be considered as a risk factor but seems rather
to discipline government size. From this perspective, and in linewith Bertola’s (2007)
argument, welfare state institutions would have no impact on labor-market volatility
when the influence of the financial markets becomes larger.
3 Data and trends
3.1 Measuring labor-market volatility
More volatile labor markets should reflect more dynamic and innovative markets
that encourage the reallocation of labor (Pagano and Pica, 2012). In that sense,
labor market volatility reflects a large dispersion of productivity/profitability across
industries. On the other hand, an increase in the volatility on labor markets is also
closely related to an increase in the dispersion of the level of earnings across workers.
Following the methodology used by Rodrik (1997; 1998), we measure the degree of
instability on labor markets by computing the volatility of hours worked (as a proxy
for instability in employment) and the volatility of wages (reflecting the instability
in earnings).
To obtain a measure of labor-market volatility, we use the EU KLEMS Database
from the OECD that provides data on total hours workers by persons engaged and
total labor compensation by skill groups (HS for high-skilledworkers and LS for low-
skilled workers) from 1970 to 2005.5 We use two measures of labor-market volatility
(See Appendix A for the construction of these two measures).
Figures 1 and 2 plot labor-market volatility, distinguishing labor-market volatility
by skill groups. Table 1 also provides summary statistics on the level of labor-market
volatility by decade and by skill group.
5All data are available on the website: www.euklems.net.
10
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 aswell as Table 1 reveal some differences in the level of volatility of hours
worked by skill groups. One can see important cross-national variations in levels and
in trends: Continental European countries (such as France, Germany, Netherlands
or Belgium) have experienced low and stable volatility of hours worked. However,
some Anglo-Saxon countries (such as Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom and to
a lesser extent the United States) have higher variations in volatility. Interestingly,
Northern European countries (such as Finland and Sweden) as well as Spain are
closer to theAnglo-Saxon countries than to the first category of countries. It is striking
that in some countries (i.e., Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom or the United
States) low-skilledworkers have beenparticularly confronting to increasing volatility
than other categories of workers. This trend is compatible with our argument that
financial development has mainly affected low-skilled workers.
As regards the volatility of wages, most of the countries in our sample have
experienced greater volatility of wages than the volatility of hours worked (Table
1). Volatility of wages reached a peak during the 1980s and is decreasing since then
but with relatively high levels of volatility. About differences across skill groups,
one finds that the volatility of wages for low-skilled workers is slightly higher than
high-skilled workers (Figure 2). There is much less cross-national variations in the
volatility of wages: as indicated in Table 1, most of the OECD countries (excluding
theUnited States that presents very stable levels of volatility) experienced an increase
in the volatility of wages during the 1980s and show similar patterns.
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Data on financial development and welfare state institutions
Our main explanatory variables are proxies for the degree of international integra-
tion of financial markets and the degree of development of the domestic financial
system. First, to capture the international dimension of financial development, we
use a common measure of international financial integration provided by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007): total assets and liabilities over GDP.6 External assets and liabili-
ties are including (i) portfolio investment (subdivided into equity securities and debt
securities), (ii) foreign direct investment that refers to equity participations above
10%, (iii) financial derivatives and (iv) reserve assets. Second, to capture the domestic
dimension of financial development, we use one measure of domestic financial de-
velopment: the stock market capitalization ratio to GDP. The stock market capitalization
ratio gives a measure of stockmarket activity, i.e. to what extent the stock market can
efficiently allocate capital to investment projects. It is assumed that amore developed
financial market also increases the investors’ opportunities for risk diversification.
6Data are freely available on Philip R. Lane’s website: http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html
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Consequently, this indicator reflects the capacity of stockmarkets to provide external
financing.
To account for welfare state institutions, we use the overall social security ex-
penditure as a percentage of GDP, taken from Armingeon et al. (2012), which is a
very standard indicator for a country’s effort in social protection. This variable is
including social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by general government
(benefits for sickness, old-age, family allowances, . . . ). Database on public social
expenditure and revenue data is freely downloaded from OECD National Accounts
Statistics.
3.3 Control variables
Our choice of control variables is in line with the existing literature. To consider
Rodrik’s (1997; 1998) argument that trade openness increaseswage elasticity of firms,
and thus increases labor-market volatility, particularly for low-skilled workers, we
compute the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP (Trade openness).
Because low-skilled workers have higher risks of becoming unemployed or jobless
and with more persistent periods of unemployment, we control for unemployment
rates as a determinant of labor-market volatility. We use the OECD time series on
standardized unemployment rates (Unemployment rate). Data on trade openness and
unemployment rate is provided by Armingeon et al. (2012). Finally, we control
for macroeconomic volatility that is expected to impact labor markets and then to
increase their volatility. We calculate the volatility of output growth by computing
the rolling standard deviation for growth rates of real GDP over a five-year-window
(Volatility of output growth).
Our sample is composed of 15OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom and United States). Table A.1 in Appendix displays descriptive
statistics for the variables used in the regressions.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of financial development on labor-
market volatility. More specifically, we want to test the argument that the impact of
financial development on the labor-market volatility is conditional to specificwelfare
state institutions. We introduced one interactive termbetweenfinancial development
and welfare state institutions. We will estimate the following relationship:
σ(yit) = β0 + β1 · FINit + β2 · SPENDit + β3 · FINit · SPENDit + βk · ΣkXk,it + µt + µi + ǫit (1)
where σ(yit) denotes rolling standard deviation for growth rates of hours worked
(or of wages) over a five-year-window, FINit the variable capturing financial devel-
opment, SPENDit the variable capturing the social security transfers as a percentage
of GDP, µt country fixed effects, µi time fixed effects,
∑
kXk,it a set of control variables,
and ǫit an error term.
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In this article, we want to explore whether governments will react to fluctuations
on labor-market by increasing social security expenditure. Our principal argument
is based on the idea that the more financially developed a country is, the more gov-
ernments will play an active role in compensating negative externalities associated
with increasing financial development. In other words, the effect of welfare state
institutions on labor-market volatility is conditional on specific levels of financial
development, as expressed as follows:
∂σ(yit)
∂SPENDit
= β̂2 + β̂3 · FINit (2)
In Equation (1), the coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the effect of the social
security transfers on labor-market volatility but when FINit equals zero. 7
Accordingly, the t values obtained from an interactive model indicate the effect
of an independent variable on the dependent variable but depending on particular
levels of another independent variable: hence, it is not surprising that insignificant
variables can produce significant marginal effects (Friedrich, 1982).
Thanks to a specific STATA procedure, we report marginal effects of the social
security transfers at different sample values of financial variables (minimum, mean
minus one standard deviation, mean, mean plus one standard deviation, maximum).
We begin by using a simple fixed effect panel data model with a panel corrected
standard errors (PCSE) estimator provided by Beck and Katz (1995). Before running
regressions, we run unit root tests to check whether our variables are stationary or
not.We find that our variables in levels are stationary, sometimes with a drift. Then,
we are able to use the ordinary least squares (OLS) with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE) as homoskedasticity and indepedence of errors are
not verified. Finally, we find that the data does not have first-order autocorrelation.
Then, we address the issue of reverse causality by running IV-GMM estimations:
welfare state institutions can be endogenous to economic conditions: as noted by
Rodrik (1998) and Fatás and Mihov (2001), governments should be capable of sta-
bilizing labor-market fluctuations if such economies are more volatile. In order to
take into account the effect of labor-market volatility on social security expenditure,
and hence to address the endogeneity problem of the welfare state variable, we run
instrumental-variable (IV) regressions. Here are considered as endogenous vari-
ables the welfare state variable as well as the interactive term between welfare state
variables and our financial variables.
7Determining the significance of the effect of SPENDit on σ(yit) conditional on FINit values, we
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But finding good instruments is always a difficult task.8 On the basis on theoret-
ical considerations and empirical analysis, we choose several instruments. First, we
want to test the argument that economic and financial globalization may have grad-
ually contributed to the reduction in the governments’ ability to finance generous
welfare programs in accordance with the ‘efficiency hypothesis’. Accordingly, glob-
alization has created new constraints on public budgets what would be associated
with a ‘welfare retrenchment’ or what Pierson (2001) called the ‘era of austerity’. So,
we include as first instruments several variables related to the budgetary situation in
the economy all provided by Armingeon et al. (2010): adjusted annual deficit, total
receipts of general government/GDP, long-term interest rate on governments bonds,
and gross government debt/GDP. Then, we seek to investigate the specific determi-
nants of social security expenditure: we include in our regressions cyclical economic
variables (i.e., real GDP growth, and current account balance/GDP), structural eco-
nomic variable (i.e., total population), institutional variables (i.e., net unemployment
replacement rates, trade union density rate and financial openness index fromChinn
and Ito, 2008) and finally political economy variables (government ideological orien-
tation, Rae’s index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system, political voting
system, political regime, and Herfindahl index of political competition).9
Finally, we submit those instruments to a series of tests to confirm its validity:
for the first test, we never reject the null hypothesis that our overidentifying re-
strictions are correct. For the other tests, we always reject the null hypothesis of
non-significance not suggesting the existence of any problems with our instrumen-
tation.
4 Estimation results
The regression results when using volatility of hours worked growth as dependent
variable are reported in Tables 2. Each financial variable is regressed against our two
dependent variables for high-skilled [HS] workers and for low-skilled [LS] workers.
Focusing on the impact of financial variables, our results indicate a positive and
significant relationship between our dependent variable and our two financial vari-
ables: financial development at the international and domestic levels is associated
with higher volatility of hours workers. We find as expected that the impact is larger
and statistically significant for low-skilled workers. Very surprisingly, we do not
find a differentiated effect of financial development on the dependent variable across
skill groups. Financial development is also associated with an increase in the volatil-
8See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a full discussion.
9Fiscal data, and total population, trade union density rate, Rae’s index of electoral fractionaliza-
tion of the party-system, political regime and political voting system are provided by Armingeon et
al. (2010); current account balance/GDP is found in the Word Bank Indicators database; net unem-
ployment replacement rates are provided by Caminada and Van Vliet (2012); government ideological
orientation is an extended version of the index proposed by Amable et al. (2006) and the Herfindahl
index of political competition is given from the Database of Political Institutions.
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ity of hours workers for high-skilled workers but the coefficient is not statistically
significant.
Then, focusing on the welfare state variable, we find a strong reducing effect of
government size on the volatility of hours worked. More interestingly, to account
for the complementarity or substituability effects between welfare state institutions
and financial development, we compute marginal effects for specific levels of each
financial variable. One can see that the marginal effect is decreasing with the level
of financial variables. These results seem to support the ‘compensation hypothesis’:
social security expenditure significantly contributes to the reduction in the volatility
of hours worked as financial development is increasing at the domestic and interna-
tional levels. Using the PCSE/OLS estimator, we find that the compensation effect
is larger for high-skilled workers. By contrast, as expected, we do find, when us-
ing the IV-GMM estimator, a larger and statistically significant effect for low-skilled
workers who are more affected by the turbulences on the labor market. Controlling
for endogeneity in the IV-GMM regressions allows us to deal with the simultaneity
bias between our dependent variable and the welfare state variable. In addition, one
should remark that the size of the coefficients associated with our several financial
variables and with the marginal effects are slightly higher than the coefficients found
in the first regressions using PCSE/OLS method in models (5) to (8). This finding
might suggest that, contrary to the ‘efficiency thesis’, financial integration which
may be associated with higher budgetary discipline will not lead to a reduction in
the governments’ ability of cushioning labor-market fluctuations.10
Among control variables, we find that unemployment and volatility of output
growth are both correlated with an increase in the standard deviation of hours
worked growth. However, results associated with trade openness are not statis-
tically robust.11
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
We run similar regressions using the volatility of wages growth as dependent
variable (Table 3). As expected, we find that the volatility of wages and our different
measures of financial development are all positively correlated. But, surprisingly, we
find that high-skilled workers are sightly more affected by an increase in volatility
of wages than low-skilled workers except in models (3) and (4) for the international
dimension of financial development. This result contrasts with Buch and Pierdzioch
10Results from first-stages (not shown) indicate a negative and significant coefficient between social
security expenditure and fiscal cyclical variables.
11Moreover, finding a highly significant coefficient in models including proxies for international
financial integration raises the risk of multicollinearity between trade openness and total assets plus
liabilities over GDP. Regressions by dropping the variable of trade openness give similar results.
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(2013) who find that the effect of financial globalization on the volatility of wages is
roughly the same for high- and low-skilled workers.
How should we explain that high-skilled workers are more affected by the finan-
cial development at the domestic dimension (models (7) and (8))? Themore frequent
use of performance-related pay (PRP) and other incentive devices by top managers
and high-skilled workers may result in the increase in the earnings volatility (OECD,
2011). Moreover, Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) show that the development of finan-
cial markets increases the uncertainty on employment and profits. These specific
earnings schemes, such as PRP and other incentive devices, are indexed on the firms’
profits (Boyer, 2005) making the wages of high-skilled workers more volatile.
Very surprisingly, we find that higher social security expenditure is associated
with an increase in the volatility of wages. This result is in line with the argument of
Carmignani et al. (2011) claiming that government would have a destabilizing effect
on macroeconomic volatility. However, if we look at the marginal effects, one can
see that the marginal effect of social security expenditure on the volatility of wages
is decreasing with the level of financial integration at the international and domestic
levels. As expected, we find a larger compensation effect for low-skilled workers
than high-skilled workers in the face of financial globalization (models (3) and (4)).
However, we find, including in the IV-GMMregressions, a larger compensation effect
of welfare state institutions for high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers in the
face of the development of the financial markets at the domestic level.
Among control variables, we find that only unemployment rate has a positive and
significant influence on our dependent variable. Trade openness andmacroeconomic
volatility give insignificant coefficients.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the consequences of increasing financial develop-
ment on labor-market instability and to explore the role of welfare state institutions
in the face of a more unstable environment. Based on the theory of financial fragility
(Keynes, 1936; Minksy, 1986; Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005), we provide in this paper
evidence of a positive relationship between the expansion of financial markets and
the instability on labor markets. Empirical work has shown that macroeconomic
volatility decreased during the 1980s and the 1990s suggesting a new era of low
risks and high returns (‘Great Moderation’). Financial development, by contrast,
has not contributed to a risk reduction on labor markets, and this despite improved
possibilities of risk-diversification.
Thus, our analysis on panel data shows that financial development is quite as-
sociated with higher labor-market instability measured by the volatility of hours
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worked and the volatility of wages. Controlling for potential reverse causality be-
tween our dependent variables andwelfare state institutions, we find that this impact
is higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. More specifically,
results clearly indicate that low-skilledworkers aremore affected by higher volatility
of hours worked. Results are, however, less robust on the impact on the volatility of
wages when controlling or not for potential reverse causality.
One major contribution of this paper is to analyze the interdependency across
financial development and welfare state institutions: we find that welfare state in-
stitutions measured by social security transfers as a percentage of GDP contribute
to the reduction in labor-market volatility. Furthermore, our results suggest that
this impact is conditional to the degree of financial exposure: the more financially
developed an economy, the more social security expenditure has a reducing-effect
on labor-market volatility. This result seems support the ‘compensation hypothesis’:
higher financial development may increase the insecurity feeling, more particularly
for low-skilled workers who will support more generous welfare programs. Gov-
ernments therefore continue to provide ample compensations to their constituency,
and this although growing globalization and tax competitionwould havemademore
difficult for governments to finance generouswelfare programs. These findings chal-
lenge the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ considering that welfare state institutions, because
they are financially unsustainable, need to be reformed. Saint-Paul (2000) argues that
‘suboptimal’ institutions can be resilient if they rely on a solid political base.
This paper provides a political-economy explanation of complementarities be-
tween financial development on the one hand and welfare state institutions on the
other hand. The evidence of the ‘compensation hypothesis’ indicates that financial
development has not reduced but increased government involvement in providing
specific compensationmechanisms. Beyond increasedvolatility of hoursworked and
of wages, Rodrik (1997) predicts that globalization may also have caused an increase
in the dispersion of earnings among low-skilled workers. Darcillon (2012) proposes
to analyze the relationship between financial development at the domestic level and
wage inequality. More specifically, we show that financial development is associated
with higher wage inequality particularly in countries with weak labor labor market
institutions. In line with our present research, Breen and García-Peñalosa (2005) find
a strong correlation between macroeconomic volatility and income inequality mea-
sured by the Gini coefficient. In other words, countries where output is very volatile
are also more unequal.
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Appendix 1: Construction of data
To obtain a measure of labor-market volatility, we use the EU KLEMS Database
from the OECD that provides data on total hours workers by persons engaged and
total labor compensation by skill groups (HS for high-skilled workers and LS for
low-skilled workers) from 1970 to 2005.12 We use two measures of labor-market
volatility:
• Hours worked: We calculate hours worked h f it for each skill level f (with
f = {HS;LS}) in country i for the year t:
h f it = H_EMPit × (H f it/100) (4)
with H_EMPit denoting the total hours worked by persons engaged and H f it
the share in total hours worked by the group of workers f (high-, or low-skilled
workers);
12All data are available on the website: www.euklems.net.
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• Average wages: We calculate average wages w f it for each skill level f (with
f = {HS;LS}) in country i for the year t:
w f it =
LABit × (LAB f it/100)
h f it
(5)
with LABit denoting labor compensation converted into constant US dollar (by
using the exchange rate series from the Penn World Tables and by deflating by
the U.S. output price index) and LAB f it the share in total labor compensation to
the group of workers f (high-, low-skilled workers);
By using these data, we obtain respectively the growth rate of hours worked











where yit is the growth rates of hours workers and of wages and y¯t+k is the
corresponding mean.
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Volatility of hours worked
abcHigh skill 0.023 0.018 0.000 0.100 437
abcLow skill 0.022 0.022 0.001 0.157 437
Volatility of wages
abcHigh skill 0.102 0.050 0.010 0.241 362
abcLow skill 0.106 0.050 0.017 0.235 362
Total assets plus liabilities/GDP 2.138 2.718 0.184 25.731 570
Debt assets plus liabilities/GDP 1.400 1.751 0.075 17.249 570
Stock market capitalization/GDP 0.697 0.431 0.056 2.659 278
Stock market value traded/GDP 0.595 0.633 0.012 3.785 294
Financial Reforms index 14.875 5.351 2.00 21.00 495
Social Expenditures/GDP 13.926 3.896 3.49 23.66 570
Trade openness 62.524 34.628 11.25 181.63 570
Unemployment rate 6.933 4.107 0.570 24.17 570
Volatility of output growth 1.634 0.843 0.178 5.092 510
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Table 1: Labor-market volatility (by decade and skill group)
Variables 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1990 2000-2007
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Hours worked volatility 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.0066 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.003
abcHigh skill 0.017 0.001 0.022 0.016 0.025 0.017 0.022 0.022
abcLow skill 0.020 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.019 0.027 0.030
Wages volatility 0.077 0.031 0.123 0.058 0.097 0.04 0.083 0.033
abcHigh skill 0.077 0.034 0.134 0.065 0.098 0.039 0.082 0.032
abcLow skill 0.080 0.030 0.136 0.062 0.100 0.039 0.089 0.039
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Table 2: Impact of financial development on standard deviation of hours worked growth
HS LS HS LS HS LS HS LS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total assets plus liabilities/GDP 0.0025 0.0032** 0.0058 0.0304*** 0.0101 0.0351** 0.0340 0.1601***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0148) (0.0328) (0.0525)
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP -0.0033*** -0.0039*** -0.0035*** -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0018)
Social expenditures/GDP -0.0031*** -0.0033*** -0.0026*** 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0030*** -0.0022 -0.0116***
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0039)
Total assets × Social exp. -0.0003** -0.0002 -0.0007** -0.0026***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Stock market cap. × Social exp. -0.0003 -0.0030*** -0.0022 -0.0116***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0039)
Trade openness 0.0002* -0.0001 0.0002 0.0011*** -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002** 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Unemployment rate 0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0010*** 0.0022*** 0.0013*** 0.0023*** 0.0017*** 0.0033***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Volatility of output growth 0.0031*** 0.0030** 0.0057*** 0.0050** 0.0061*** 0.0058*** 0.0062*** 0.0025
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0030)
Constant 0.0267* 0.0496** 0.0437** 0.0893***
(0.0138) (0.0214) (0.0204) (0.0323)
Marginal effects of social security expenditures conditional to financial level
Min -0.0032*** -0.0033*** -0.0023*** -0.0011 -0.0033*** -0.0040*** -0.0036*** -0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0016)
Mean_less_sd -0.0029*** -0.0032*** -0.0016* 0.0004 -0.0033*** -0.0047*** -0.0041*** -0.0033***
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Mean -0.0038*** -0.0037*** -0.0042*** -0.0052*** -0.0035*** -0.0060*** -0.0050*** -0.0083***
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0017)
Mean_plus_sd -0.0046*** -0.0043*** -0.0068*** -0.0109*** -0.0036*** -0.0073*** -0.0059*** -0.0133***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0032)
Max -0.0122*** -0.0085** -0.0268*** -0.0547*** -0.0041* -0.0189*** -0.0092* -0.0311***
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0151) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0056) (0.0091)
Observations 437 437 278 278 278 278 278 278
R-squared 0.4610 0.4108 - - 0.5494 0.4777 - -
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator PCSE/OLS PCSE/OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM PCSE/OLS PCSE/OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) - - 0.1108 0.2981 - - 0.4951 0.9078
Kleibergen-Paap LM χ2-statistic (p-value) - - 0.0000 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0001
Anderson-Rubin χ2 test (p-value) - - 0.0000 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0000
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) - - 0.0050 0.0050 - - 0.0009 0.0009
Kleibergen-Paap LM F-statistic - - 2.300 2.300 - - 5.277 5.277
Note: (Panel corrected) standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
HS = high-skilled workers and LS = low-skilled workers
Endogenous variables: Social expenditures/GDP, Total assets × Social exp.
Instruments: Social expenditures/GDP (lag), adjusted annual deficit/GDP, total receipts of general government/GDP, long-term interest rate on government bonds,
gross government debt/GDP, real GDP growth, current account balance/GDP, total population, net unemployment replacement rate, trade union density rate,
financial openness index, government ideological orientation, Rae’s index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system, political voting system, political regime,
Herfindahl index of political competition
STATA provides different tests: (1) Overidentifying restrictions (Sargan-Hansen-J statistic): the null hypothesis of this first test is that the instruments are valid
instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. If the null is not rejected,
the overidentification restrictions are valid; (2) Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic): the underidentification test is relevant to verify whether the
equation is quite identified: in this case, instruments are relevant in the sense that they are correlated with assumed endogenous regressions. The null hypothesis
cannot be rejected; (3) Endogenous regressors tests (Anderson-Rubin χ2 test and Anderson-Rubin F-test): the Anderson-Rubin tests are tests of the significance
of endogenous regressors in the structural estimated equation: the null hypothesis tested is that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural
equation are jointly equal to zero; (4) Weak-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic or Cragg-Donald): the Kleibergen-Paap (or Cragg-Donald) test of the
weak-instruments problem that arises when the correlations between the endogenous regressors and the excluded instruments are nonzero but small. The null
hypothesis is that the estimator is weakly identified in the sense that it is subject to bias that the investigator finds unacceptably large. To be able to reject the null
that the size of the test is unacceptably large the Cragg-Donald F-statistic must exceed the tabulated critical value. See Baum et al. (2007) for more details on testing
the relevance and validity of instruments.
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Table 3: Impact of financial development on standard deviation of wages growth
HS LS HS LS HS LS HS LS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total assets plus liabilities/GDP 0.0120*** 0.0090*** 0.0272*** 0.0355***
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0072) (0.0120)
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 0.1149*** 0.0977*** 0.4186*** 0.3640***
(0.0231) (0.0201) (0.1099) (0.1131)
Social expenditures/GDP 0.0045*** 0.0043*** 0.0045** 0.0076*** 0.0061*** 0.0064*** 0.0138*** 0.0143***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0040) (0.0041)
Total assets × Social exp. -0.0014*** -0.0012*** -0.0027*** -0.0035***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Stock market cap. × social exp. -0.0070*** -0.0055*** -0.0314*** -0.0273***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0079) (0.0080)
Trade openness 0.0005* 0.0004 -0.0011** -0.0007 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008* -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Unemployment rate 0.0036*** 0.0032*** 0.0045*** 0.0044*** 0.0033*** 0.0022** 0.0053*** 0.0026
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Volatility of output growth 0.0007 0.0040 -0.0105*** -0.0094*** 0.0025 0.0086** -0.0102* -0.0024
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0054) (0.0055)
Constant -0.0138 0.0152 - - -0.0602* -0.0557
(0.0280) (0.0258) - - (0.0352) (0.0356)
Marginal effects of social security expenditures conditional to financial level
Min 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0040* 0.0070*** 0.0057** 0.0060*** 0.0112*** 0.0127***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Mean_less_sd 0.0053*** 0.0050*** 0.0061** 0.0096*** 0.0042*** 0.0049*** 0.0054** 0.0070***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0026)
Mean 0.0015 0.0017* -0.0012 0.0002 0.0012 0.0025*** -0.0081*** -0.0047
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Mean_plus_sd -0.0023* -0.0015 -0.0085*** -0.0093** -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0217*** -0.0165***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0061)
Max -0.0316*** -0.0267*** -0.0646*** -0.0821*** -0.0126*** -0.0083*** -0.0698*** -0.0582***
(0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0187) (0.0309) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0176) (0.0180)
Observations 362 362 332 332 248 248 230 230
R-squared 0.5494 0.4777 - - 0.5494 0.4777 - -
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator PCSE/OLS PCSE/OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM PCSE/OLS PCSE/OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) - - 0.1192 0.1231 - - 0.5475 0.2615
Kleibergen-Paap LM χ2-statistic (p-value) - - 0.0000 0.0009 - - 0.0002 0.0004
Anderson-Rubin χ2 test (p-value) - - 0.0012 0.0016 - - 0.0001 0.0000
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) - - 0.0020 0.0025 - - 0.0005 0.0000
Kleibergen-Paap LM F-statistic - - 8.851 5.352 - - 3.894 3.442
Note: (Panel corrected) standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
HS = high-skilled workers and LS = low-skilled workers
Endogenous variables: Social expenditures/GDP, Total assets × Social exp.
Instruments: Social expenditures/GDP (lag), adjusted annual deficit/GDP, total receipts of general government/GDP, long-term interest rate on government bonds,
gross government debt/GDP, real GDP growth, current account balance/GDP, total population, net unemployment replacement rate, trade union density rate,
financial openness index, government ideological orientation, Rae’s index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system, political voting system, political regime,
Herfindahl index of political competition
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Figure 2: Volatiltiy of wages (by skill groups)
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